The Pornography Debate

    Suppose one accepts MacKinnon and Dworkin\'s suggested


statutory definition of pornography.   How does one who


generally accepts MacKinnon and Dworkin\'s views on the


pervasively harmful effect of pornography, and who accepts a need


for legal redress of the harms perpetrated by pornography, deal


with pornographic material?


    The ordinance proposed by MacKinnon and Dworkin would deal


with such material by enacting legislation which gives people


adversely affected by the works, which clearly fit their


definition of pornography, a cause of action against the


producers, vendors, exhibitors or distributors for


\"trafficking\", or for an assault \"directly caused by the


specific work.


    I do not think liberals, or others for that matter, should


have much problem with the clause dealing with assault, since a


causal connection to specific works is demanded by it.   However,


s. 3.2(iii) which deals with trafficking would be very


problematic for liberals and legal conservatives because it


creates a cause of action for a person contrary to the


traditional conception of a rights holder\'s cause of action.


This subsection reads:


          Any woman has a claim hereunder as a woman acting


          against the subordination of women.   Any man, child or


          transsexual who alleges injury by pornography in the


          way women are injured by it also has a claim.


          [emphasis added]




    My goal in this paper is to suggest that a slight


modification to this subsection of the ordinance would make it


very difficult for liberals and legal conservatives to object to


it.   This modification would restrict the cause of action to the


same persons as the other sections of the ordinance, namely, the


particular victim of the specified injury....